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RIGHTS GONE WILD
Vaughan Black*
In the Western democracies charters o f  rights abound, fo r  cheap moralizing has 
become the order o f the day.
Robert A. Samek1
1. Introduction
(a) The Appearance of Right-to-Hunt Acts
Grumbling about the advent of the Canadian Charter o f Rights and Freedoms twen- 
ty-three years ago, Bob Samek observed that we hadn’t bled, struggled or even asked 
for it, didn’t need it, hadn’t a clue what it meant, and would not -  except maybe for 
the lawyers and judges among us -  benefit from it. He argued as well that it was mis­
conceived, clichéd and badly written as well.
But at least in 1982 we knew that the Charter had arrived; government-spon­
sored public spectacles and cheerleading national media made sure of that. It is not 
clear that even that much can be said for the subject of this paper, the right-to-hunt 
legislation that has recently crept almost unnoticed into provincial statute books. 
Within the past three years, the provincial legislatures of Canada’s three most popu­
lous provinces have lengthened our list of legal and political liberties by affirming 
that the capacity of humans to stalk and kill non-humans for enjoyment is among the 
former’s cherished fundamental rights. British Columbia’s Hunting and Fishing 
Heritage Act,2 quoted here in full, will serve as an instance of this curious develop­
ment:
* Earlier versions of this paper were presented as seminars at the Peter Wall Institute at the University 
of British Columbia, the Faculty of Law at the University of Victoria, and Dalhousie Law School. I 
thank participants in those seminars for their comments. I also thank Helene Wheeler and Alex 
Schwartz for excellent research assistance.
1 “Untrenching Fundamental Rights” (1982) 27 McGill L.J. 755 at 761.
2 S.B.C. 2002, c. 79 (in force November 2002).
WHEREAS hunting and fishing are an important part o f British Columbia’s her­
itage and form an important part o f the fabric o f present-day life in British 
Columbia;
WHEREAS hunters and anglers contribute to the understanding, conservation, 
and management o f fish and wildlife in British Columbia;
WHEREAS hunting and fishing should be recognized as legitimate forms of 
recreation and as legitimate tools with which to effectively manage the fish and 
wildlife o f British Columbia;
THEREFORE HER MAJESTY, by and with the advice and consent of the 
Legislative Assembly of the Province of British Columbia, enacts as follows:
1. A person has the right to hunt and fish in accordance with the law.
Modeled on an act passed by Ontario’s legislature five months previously -  which 
sported similar preambular sentiments3 and an identical section I4 -  British 
Columbia’s right-to-hunt legislation does not appear to be limited to declaring the 
rights of residents of that province, or even of Canadians. Rather, like Ontario’s 
statute it proclaims that the right to hunt is among the rights of persons. And like 
Ontario’s act, B.C.’s legislation passed the provincial legislature with all-party sup­
port. Indeed both statutes met with but a single dissenting vote, in each case from an 
urban-based MLA.5 A month after British Columbia bestowed this general right to 
hunt, Québec’s National Assembly discovered and affirmed the same freedom. 
However, Québec went a step further than either British Columbia or Ontario, sup­
plementing its new-found right by making it an offence for anyone to knowingly 
hinder someone’s exercising his or her legal right to hunt, for instance by disturbing 
or frightening the huntees.6
3 Except that it did not claim that everyday life in Ontario had a fabric.
4 Heritage Hunting and Fishing Act 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 10 (in force 27 June 2002).
5 In Ontario the single dissenting vote was cast by Marilyn Churley, the NDP member from Toronto 
Danforth. In British Columbia it came from Jeff Bray, the Liberal member from Victoria-Beacon Hill.
6 An Act to amend the Act respecting the Conservation and Development of Wildlife, S.Q.2002, c. 82, 
s. 3 (in force 19 December 2002). It appears that the Québec Bill passed unanimously. Certainly no one 
spoke against it. The vote was oral and there is no indication in the record of the debates of anyone 
saying anything other than “adopté”: Québec Hansard, 36th Leg., 2nd Sess.,19 Dec. 2002.
This was not the first anti-hunter-harassment legislation in Canada. Several other provinces had 
passed such legislation in the mid-1980s. However, Québec’s anti-hunter harassment legislation is the 
first to be expressly linked to a right to hunt.
One should also note the existence of a right-to-hunt bill in the Yukon: Heritage Hunting and 
Fishing Act, Bill 103, Legislative Assembly of Yukon, 31st Ass., 1st Sess. (first reading 29 March 
2004).
So the great majority of Canadians now live in a province that has seen fit to 
legislatively vouchsafe to them a general right to hunt and fish (and, in the case of 
Québec, trap). These rights have been conferred with little fanfare, little media atten­
tion, little scholarly scrutiny, little public awareness (at least in cities), and, as this 
paper will suggest, little thought.
Arguably this absence of public attention or academic analysis is just as it 
should be, since, at least as one line of thinking would have it, right-to-hunt statutes 
do not actually do anything, or at least anything of legal consequence stricto sensu. 
The statutes only grant a right to hunt in accordance with the law. That is, at least 
according to their sponsors, right-to-hunt acts are symbolic and do not alter legal out­
comes. Before they were enacted, persons had the right -  or, if you want to get 
Hohfeldian about it, the privilege -  to hunt, but of course this was tightly regulated 
by law. For starters, one had to have a license (obtainable only after taking a training 
course) and be of a certain age; and further, one could hunt only in certain places, 
only with certain weapons, not from an aircraft or moving vehicle, not while 
impaired, only at certain times of the day and year, and only while dressed in pre­
scribed colours. Also, one could legally hunt only certain species, sometimes only a 
certain sex or size of that species, and even then kill only so many of them. In addi­
tion to these state-enacted regulatory controls, one’s liberty to hunt did not override 
private property rights.7 Nor did that freedom override the ability of others to turn to 
the common law -  for instance actions in negligence or nuisance -  to seek remedies 
for harms to them caused by hunting and its externalities. Proponents of right-to-hunt 
statutes professed to change none of this. Having a statutory right to hunt would not 
mean that persons would no longer need to acquire a license or could henceforth 
engage in trespass in pursuit of their quarry. Right-to-hunt legislation, in other words, 
would have less effect than the Canadian Bill o f Rights*
That being the case, it may be fair to claim that, given the manifest legal and 
social ills in the world, provincial proclamations of a right to hunt are not deserving 
of much attention. Since they are intended to be wholly symbolic and, in a sense, 
transitory and paralegal, they might be thought to have an ephemerality comparable
7 Or at least not entirely. There are statutory provisions which alter the common law by according 
hunters and anglers the right to enter onto private property while engaging in those practices unless the 
owner of the property has posted signs expressly forbidding that activity. See, for instance, New 
Brunswick’s Fish and Wildlife Act, S.N.B. 1980, c. F-14.1, s. 80 (10). Nova Scotia has gone further. It 
allows anglers (but not hunters) the right to engage in what would otherwise be trespass, even if the 
landowner objects: Angling Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 14.
8 S.C. 1960, c. 44. Of course all legal rights, even those in the Charter, are in some respects limited by 
law. Charter rights are of course explicitly limited by s. 1 (and many of them are potentially override- 
noverridden by s. 33). They may also be limited when they clash with other Charter rights, or even 
with the same right held by another person.
to the statutes recently enacted by most provinces declaring a Holocaust Memorial 
Day.9 Perhaps all that is worthy of note is that provincial legislatures have started 
using the statute books for the rhetorical statements that used to be expressed mere­
ly as house resolutions. Once upon a time, such essentially emblematic gestures as 
an acknowledgement that the Holocaust occurred and that it was a very bad thing, or 
that hunting was a commendable pursuit and people were entitled to engage in it 
within the bounds of the law, might have taken the form of resolutions of the legis­
lature. That is, they might have been voted on (usually with unanimous support) and 
win mention in Hansard, but they would not be expressed as statutes. However, the 
new style of symbolic legislative gesture appears to be to pass a statute, one with the 
same structure as British Columbia’s Hunting and Fishing Heritage Act: a parade of 
“whereas’s” -  e.g., whereas the Holocaust happened, whereas it was a terrible thing, 
whereas it should never be forgotten -  followed by a single substantive section, 
which in the case of Holocaust Memorial Day legislation simply says that there shall 
be a Holocaust Memorial Day every year. Such statutes cost nothing; no moralizing 
could come more cheaply. Holocaust Memorial Day is not elevated into a public hol­
iday and the statutes neither commit the government to spending a penny to celebrate 
it nor saddle any ministry or other official with any responsibility to do anything to 
assist in its observance. It is no easy chore to imagine circumstances in which such 
statutes would be justiciable.10
Conceivably, right-to-hunt legislation is the same sort of feel-good statute: a 
group hug between the legislature and hunters, but of no greater legal significance 
(though perhaps of slightly higher status) than if the legislature had simply passed a 
resolution that hunting was a laudable activity.11 If that is the case then an article 
analyzing it is of no more import than one devoted to the Holocaust Memorial Day 
acts.
9 Holocaust Memorial Day Act, 1988, S.O. 1988, c. 25; Holocaust Memorial Day Act, S.B.C. 2000, 
c. 3; Holocaust Memorial Day Act, S.N.S. 2000, c. 1; Holocaust Memorial Day and Genocide 
Remembrance Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. H-10; Holocaust Memorial Day Act, C.C.S.M. H68; Holocaust 
Memorial Day Act, S.N.L. 2001, c. H-4.1; Holocaust Memorial Day Act, S.S. 2001, c. H-4.001. The 
Federal Government enacted a similar statute last two years ago: Holocaust Memorial Day Act, S.C. 
2003, c. 24.
10 But it is interesting to try. Ponder this scenario. Canadian Holocaust Memorial Day legislation has 
been remarkably specific in defining what the Holocaust was. It stipulates that the Nazis (not the 
Germans) killed 6 million Jews. An issue might arise, say in a prosecution for communicating hate 
propaganda, as to the number of Jews killed in the Holocaust. For instance someone might claim that 
the figure was 5 >/2 million. Is it now the case, thanks to Holocaust Memorial Day statutes, that the 
number has for legal purposes in Canada been irrebuttably set at an even 6 million?
11 There have been legislative resolutions respecting the right to hunt in Canada, especially respecting 
the seal hunt: House of Commons Debates, 4th Sess. 30th Pari. (5 March 1979) at 3795 (James 
McGrath); House of Commons Debates, 1st Sess., 32nd Pari. (9 February 1982) 14797 (James 
McGrath). Both were unanimously approved.
Nevertheless, I have elected to write about it. Even if right-to-hunt legislation’s 
significance turns out to be merely symbolic, it is worth pausing to note which sym­
bols the government elects to statutorily rejoice in and which it does not. Provincial 
legislatures have so far not chosen to affirm or commemorate a statutory right to go 
bowling, collect stamps, or wear green clothes, but they have now legislatively 
acknowledged a right to hunt and fish. It may be worth asking why; after all, even 
the “purely symbolic” Holocaust Memorial Day legislation did not enter the statute 
books without at least a little public controversy. In some provinces, Armenian 
groups protested that, if there was to be a day and a statute to mark the Shoah, then 
fairness and equality dictated there should be one to memorialize the Armenian geno­
cide of 1915.12 To date, however, the wish for an Armenian Genocide Day has not 
been granted, and it will not be, not least because by doing so governments would 
alienate the ethnic Turkish vote. Symbols count, and government action to take note
-  statutorily, even if non-justiciably -  of one phenomenon but not another counts a 
fair bit.
Furthermore, regardless of legislators’ intent when speaking or voting in 
favour of the statutory recognition of a general right to hunt, we may turn out to be 
mistaken in thinking that such governmental acts can be consequence free. This is 
principally due to the loaded word “right”, which cannot easily be shorn of the 
potent, even if often ill-defined, meaning that lawyers and courts are disposed to 
accord it. Even without endorsing the broad Charter—doubting theme of this paper’s 
epigram, one can accept that the state’s granting of fundamental rights -  or even gov­
ernmental actions which gesture toward the form of such grants -  is a serious busi­
ness which should not be resorted to without sustained thought and broad public 
debate. Thus, while legislatures might understandably be attracted to “right” because 
of the term’s valorizing rhetorical cachet -  one thinks here of such relatively recent 
legislation as Ontario’s Environmental Bill o f Rights13 or Victims’ Bill o f Rights,14 
which on inspection are substantively elusive (and arguably empty15), but which 
have evocative titles -  they should think twice before employing that term.
12 Other genocides, not to mention various mass enslavements, forced diaspora and sundry other atroc­
ities, also suggest themselves as candidates for a commemorative day, and the list seems certain to 
lengthen.
13 S.O. 1993, c. 28.
I4S.O. 1995, c. 6.
15 Mark S. Winfield, “A Political and Legal Analysis of Ontario’s Environmental Bill of Rights”
(1998), 47 U.N.B. L.J. 325 and Elaine Hughes & David Iyalombe, “Substantive Environmental Rights 
in Canada” (1999), 30 Ottawa L. Rev. 229. The Northwest Territories was the first Canadian jurisdic­
tion to take this step: Environmental Rights Act, S.N.W.T. 1990. c. 38. The following year the Yukon 
put an Environmental Bill of Rights in its Environment Act. S.Y. 1991, c. 5.
A related problem with the promiscuous exploitation of “right” is that the pro­
liferation of legal rights -  the growing tendency to cast any claim that X is a good 
thing in the form of a statement that people have a right to X -  may function to dilute 
and cheapen those core 18th-century rights that are central to personhood, especial­
ly the right to life. (That is presumably the sort of sentiment which crossed the read­
er’s mind when I mentioned the possibility of a statutory right to go bowling.) This 
serves to remind us that the increase of legal rights of which right-to-hunt legislation 
is an instance is simply one part of a more general propagation of “rights talk” in 
social and moral discourse, a growth which sees purchase of some consumer prod­
ucts resulting in the acquisition of a piece of paper that, while it might once have 
been called a warranty or guarantee, is now labeled an owner’s bill of rights. This 
article will not engage with that broad phenomenon but rather will focus on the spe­
cific issue of statutory rights, and in particular granting “rights” in statutes that are 
supposed to possess only symbolic value.
It is my sense that of the two concerns I have identified with the haphazard 
granting of rights in symbolic statutes statutes -  (1) the fear that they might turn out 
to be more than merely symbolic, and (2) the fear that they might operate to cheap­
en those rights that really matter -  the former is the more significant. It is certainly 
the more amenable to proof, and one (admittedly pretty modest) recommendation 
that will emerge from this paper is that if provincial governments do find themselves 
carried away by the urge to express their love for hunters they should stick to the 
model of Holocaust Memorial Day legislation, in which “right” makes no appear­
ance. That is, they should take rights sufficiently seriously so as to avoid littering the 
statute books with them quite as freely as they have recently been inclined to.16
16 The action of the Newfoundland and Labrador in this regard should be noted. On 6 July 1999 that 
province issued a press release that promulgated a sort of mission statement with respect to the out­
doors, chessily entitled Our Smiling Land (http://www.gov.nf.ca/releases/1999/drr/smiling.htm). This 
includes a “Declaration of Rights of Newfoundlanders and Labradorians to the Use of the Outdoors” 
and this includes the following:
The Government of Newfoundland and Labrador hereby declares and affirms the traditional 
privileges and freedoms of hunting, angling and the gathering of wild foods by the citizens of 
this Province.
The notion of a declaration of rights to use of the outdoors may be an instance of the cheapening pro­
liferation of rights, but at least it is not a statutory one.
Nova Scotia’s contribution should also be noted. Unlike Newfoundland and Labrador, and in 
line with B.C., Ontario and Québec, Nova Scotia chose to celebrate hunting in a statutory form. 
However, Nova Scotia did not deploy the word “right”. It did not even enact something that looked like 
a substantive provision. Rather, by S.N.S. 2001, c. 46 it added sub-s. (ba) to the interpretation provi­
sion of its Wildlife Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 504:
s. 2 The object and purpose of this Act is to . . .
(ba) recognize that angling, hunting and trapping are valued and safe parts of the her­
itage of the Province and that the continuing opportunity to participate in those activi­
ties will be maintained in accordance with this Act and regulations . . . .
What I do in the rest of this article is first to offer some suggestions as to why 
we have recently witnessed the arrival of a statutory recognition of a general right to 
hunt in Canada. The answer here turns out not to be monocausal; rather, a curious 
concatenation of forces seems to have operated. I look as well at “the official story”
-  that is, the reasons provincial legislators have offered as justification for the pas­
sage of this legislation. There is nothing here in the nature of reports of law reform 
commissions, government white papers or election platforms. Right-to-hunt acts did 
not arise as the result of any international treaty or extensive domestic consultation 
process.17 The main source of official justification for the passage of right-to-hunt 
acts is to be found in the debates of the three provincial legislative assemblies that 
passed such acts, and accordingly I will offer a brief summary of these. Finally, as 
noted above, I conclude the paper with a note of concern about such legislation, sug­
gesting that, principally because of its exploitation of the term “right”, its effect 
might, at least somewhere down the road, extend beyond the purely symbolic role 
claimed for it at its inception.
(b) Brief Interpolation on Animal Welfare and Legal Change
But before I do that I offer this note situating right-to-hunt acts in the context of other 
recent Canadian legislative initiatives which bear on non-humans. In particular, it is 
interesting to contrast the success of right-to-hunt acts with the fate of the other main 
animal-related legislative effort in recent years, one which did capture a measure of 
public notice: the attempt to reform the Criminal Code's outdated animal cruelty pro­
visions. The same period that saw the advent of a legislative acknowledgement of a 
human right to kill non-humans saw an ongoing effort by the federal government to 
update the country’s chief animal cruelty prohibition, which had not been signifi­
cantly altered since Victorian times. Starting with a discussion paper in 1998 and a 
bill the following year, the Chrétien government proceeded to try repeatedly to get 
Parliament to improve this dated part of the Criminal Code, principally by increas­
ing the penalty for the offence of cruelty to animals. However, these bills never man­
aged to pass. Thanks to vigorous lobbying by animal use interests -  lobbying which 
included portraying the originators and supporters of the bills as internationally- 
funded animal liberationists with hidden agenda and terrorist proclivities18 -  the ini­
tiative to reform these archaic Criminal Code provisions had been effectively
17 In fact British Columbia’s Hunting and Fishing Heritage Act is a rare instance of a private member’s 
bill finding its way into law, only the second such since 1984.
18 Standing Committee on Justice and Humans Rights, 37th Pari., 1st Sess., 16 October 2001, testimo­
ny of Alan Herscovici, Executive Vice-President, Fur Council of Canada, at pp. 2-3.
stalled.19 The proposed revisions were in fact relatively modest ones, but they met 
with vigorous opposition from the members of the former Alliance and Progressive 
Conservative parties. The fact that recurring efforts by a majority government did not 
suffice to bring them into law contrasts markedly with the statutory recognition of a 
right to hunt, which, as noted, garnered all-party support and minimal opposition.
This is worth noting because it might easily be assumed that increasing socie­
tal interest in animal welfare has resulted in greater legal protection for non-humans. 
In some countries this is so. In recent years countries of the European Union have 
enacted legislation that has significantly bettered the lot of non-humans, especially 
in industrial agriculture and related activities such as transportation. In 2002, the year 
that Ontario, British Columbia, and Québec were enshrining the right to hunt, 
Germany went the other direction and added animal protection to its constitution.20
19 A brief summary. The 1999 bill (Bill C-17, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (cruelty to animals, 
disarming a peace officer and other amendments) and the Firearms Act (technical amendments), 2nd 
Sess., 36th Pari., 1999) was not vigorously pursued and it died in the House of Commons when the fed­
eral election of 2000 was called. The proposed amendment was re-introduced in 2001 (Bill C-15, An 
Act to amend the Criminal Code, 1st Sess., 37th Pari., 2001) and passed by the House of Commons 
three times. It was rejected twice in the Senate, and when it reached the Senate after the Commons 
passed it for the third time it was stalled there and died in November 2003 when the new Liberal leader 
Paul Martin dissolved Parliament. It was introduced yet again in March 2004 (Bill C-22, An Act to 
amend the Criminal Code (cruelty to animals), 3rd Sess., 37th Pari., 2004) and quickly passed by the 
House of Commons, but the Senate stalled it yet again so it expired when the federal election of June 
2004 was called.
At the date of writing it remains unclear whether it will be introduced yet again during the 38th 
Parliament which began meeting in the fall of 2004. However, the new Minister of Justice, Irwin 
Cotier, has suggested that his legislative priority is human rights; such a priority does not bode well for 
non-humans.The amendments were reintroduced in the 38th Parliament in slightly modified form. On
16 May 2005 the Minister of Justice, Irwin Cotier, introduced Bill C-50, An Act to amend the Criminal
Code in respect of cruelty to animals, 38th Pari., 1st Sess., 2005.
For helpful commentary on the attempts to reform the animal cruelty provisions of the Code see 
Lynn Letoumeau, “Toward Animal Liberation?” (2003) 40 Alta. L. Rev. 1041, F.C. DaCoste, “Animals 
and Political Community: Preliminary Reflections Prompted by Bill C-10” (2003) Alta. L. Rev. 1057,
and John Sorenson “Some Strange Things Happening in Our Country” (2003) 12 Soc. & Leg Stud. 
377, and Christina Skibinsky, “Changes in Store for the Livestock Industry? Canada’s Recurring 
Proposed Animal Cruelty Amendments” (2005) 66 Sask. L. Rev. 173. .
20 But not by employing the term “right” and not in a way which would prohibit most existing uses of 
animals. What the votes in the Bundestag and Bundesrat did was to add “and the animals” ( “und die 
Tiere ”) to Article 20a of the German constitution, which required the state to protect the dignity of peo­
ple. Germany was not the first country to offer protection to non-humans in its national constitution; 
Switzerland had done so in 1992.
It is too early to tell what the effect of protecting animals in the German constitution will be. 
In the past, some aspects of the existing animal protection law, the Tierschutzgesetz, have been held 
ineffective because they appear to conflict with certain constitution rights. Now that animals them­
selves are mentioned in the constitution it may turn out that it will be harder to override the provisions 
of the Tierschutzgesetz in an anti-animal direction.
New Zealand21 has outlawed experimentation on primates and England and Wales 
have recently banned the fox hunt.22 On the North American legal front, however, 
things for non-humans are getting worse, not better. Although there have been a few 
pro-animal legal initiatives in the face of (mostly foreign) consumer pressure -  such 
as a European boycott of Canadian furs that resulted in limits on the types of traps 
used in this country to catch fur-bearing animals23 -  both in statute books and in their 
material lives, the situation for non-humans in Canada is either standing still or get­
ting grimmer. The statutory acknowledgement of a right to hunt is an instance of the 
latter.
2. Some Context, With Gestures toward a Causal Account
Insofar as this section purports to offer the “real” explanation for the appearance of 
right-to-hunt acts, or at least to set out some context that has a causal spin to it, and 
the next section purports to summarize the official explanation for the statutes, there 
is bound to be some overlap between the two parts. Legislators are likely to speak 
truthfully at least some of the time. Despite the overlap I find it helpful to keep the 
two parts separate. This part thus attempts the essentially sociological task of offer­
ing some context for the appearance of right-to-hunt acts in Canada. The next part 
summarizes the justifications advanced by legislators.
(a) Back in the U.S.A. -  Hunter Harassment
Perhaps the first thing to note about the emergence of pro-hunting legislative initia­
tives is that Canada is not alone here. Although the United Kingdom Parliament has 
recently acted to limit hunting,24 the legislative trend in the United States in recent
21 Animal Welfare Act 1999 (N.Z.), 1999 No. 142, s. 85. Canada, on the other hand, is the only indus­
trialized western democracy that lacks a national statute focusing on scientific experimentation on non­
humans.
22 The much debated Hunting Act 2004 (U.K.), 2004, c. 37 passed the House of Commons on 
September 15, 2004, and on 16 November 2004 the Commons rejected a series of proposed amend­
ments by the House of Lords. Because this was the second time the Commons had passed that bill with­
in a year it could become an act of Parliament without the concurrence of the House of Lords. It came 
into force in February 2005. The statute outlaws the hunting of wild mammals with dogs, which will 
mean the end of the traditional fox hunt. Scotland had enacted a comparable but not identical ban two 
years previously: Protection of Wild Mammals (Scotland) Act 2002, asp 2002, c. 6.
As another instance of the fact that Europe and North America seem to be moving in opposite 
directions when it comes to hunting non-humans, Montana recently moved to allow hunting of certain 
animals with the aid of dogs, a practice which had not previously been permitted: Montana H.B. 32, 
passed on 26 March 2003.
23 See for example s. 4(4)(f.l) of Reg. 84-124 passed under New Brunswick’s Fish and Wildlife Act, 
S.N.B. 1980, c. F-14.1 and its equivalent in other provinces.
24 Supra note 22.
years has been in a pro-hunting direction. Of particular interest here is a 1998 amend­
ment to the Constitution of the State of Minnesota:
Hunting and fishing and the taking of game and fish are a valued part of our her­
itage that shall forever be managed by law and regulation for the public good.25
That amendment did not employ the term “right”, but subsequent amendments to 
U.S. state constitutions in recent years have used that word. There are now ten 
American states with constitutional protections for hunters.26 Of course, observing 
that there have been comparable developments in the United States does not amount 
to explaining why the right to hunt has made an appearance in Canada. It simply 
locates the Canadian development as part of a broader North American trend.
A related statutory development is worth noting here, especially because, at 
least in Québec, it is closely tied to right-to-hunt legislation. Starting in the 1980s, 48 
American states passed anti-hunter harassment statutes.27 These were in ostensible 
response to the activities of animal liberationists who went into the woods in hunt­
ing season with the avowed goal of scaring quarry away from its pursuers. A number 
of Canadian provinces followed suit.28
There is much to be said about such legislation, particularly from the point of 
view of possible constitutional challenges based on the infringement of rights of free­
dom of speech or expression -  a matter which has been litigated in the United States, 
with inconsistent results in lower courts and as yet no resolution by the Supreme 
Court. That will not be pursued here. I mention anti-hunter harassment statutes sim­
ply by way of noting this widespread, pro-hunter legislative phenomenon that took 
place in the years leading up to the appearance of right-to-hunt legislation.
25 Constitution of Minnesota, Article XIII, § 12 (adopted 3 November 1998).
26 Alabama, California, Louisiana, Minnesota, Montana, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, 
Virginia and Wisconsin. Here is Wisconsin’s constitutional provision, which is very similar to B.C.’s 
statute:
The People have the right to fish, hunt, trap, and take game subject only to reasonable 
restrictions as prescribed by law. (Constitution of Wisconsin, Art. I, § 26, April 2003.).
27 Most of these are conveniently collected by the Animal Rights Law Project at http://www-animal- 
law.org/huntharass/index.html.
28 In the U.S. anti-hunter harassment legislation took the form of stand-alone statutes. In Canada it was 
expressed as additions to existing wildlife statutes, e.g., Wildlife Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. W-10, Wildlife 
Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c. W-4; Wildlife Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 504, s. 38. These statutes raise interest­
ing freedom of expression issues, since some of them go so far as to make it an offence to disturb a 
person who is preparing to hunt with the intention of dissuading that person from hunting.
(b) The Cancelled Spring Bear Hunt -  a Charter Right to Kill?
Ontario’s right-to-hunt legislation was the first to appear, and one quite specific piece 
of context for that statute is that province’s 1999 cancellation of the spring black bear 
hunt,29 which resulted in a court challenge by the Ontario Federation of Hunters and 
Anglers (OFAH) and the Northern Ontario Tourist Outfitters Association (NOTO) 
based on, among other things, the argument that the Canadian Charter o f Rights and 
Freedoms should be interpreted so as to grant a general right to hunt. The story in 
brief is that, in a rare (at least in Canada) concession to the animal welfare lobby, in 
1999 Ontario’s Harris government brought in a regulation under the Fish and 
Wildlife Conservation Act30 which eliminated the spring bear hunt. The hunt had 
come under attack from largely urban-based animal welfare advocates for being 
unfair, since in spring the bears’ natural wariness was reduced by hunger, making 
them easy pickings for hunters. In addition, killing female bears at a time when their 
children were still dependant on them was perceived as likely to result in the death 
by starvation of orphan bears -  and even though this might not threaten the popula­
tion of black bears, which was estimated to be doing pretty well, it seemed inhumane.
OFAH and NOTO launched an application for judicial review, arguing that the 
regulation canceling the hunt was ultra vires since, under the relevant statute, the 
government had no right to limit the killing of bears based only on fairness or animal 
welfare grounds. The applicants maintained that under the Fish and Wildlife 
Conservation Act hunting seasons might legitimately be curtailed or cancelled due to 
conservation or safety concerns, but not on the grounds that a particular hunt was too 
easy or inhumane. They supplemented that by claiming that hunting was a form of 
expression and thus protected by s. 2(b) of the Charter and that their s. 7 rights were 
accordingly being violated. The litigation got side-tracked on procedural and evi­
dentiary matters31 and, though technically still alive, is moribund -  with the appli­
cant’s claim that the Charter includes a right to hunt remaining undecided.32
One reason it is undecided is that Ontario’s conservative Conservative gov­
ernment, repenting of its pro-animal lapse, sought to appease the offended hunting
29 Ontario Regulation 670/98, made 4 March 1999.
30S.O. 1997, c. 41.
31 Ontario Federation of Anglers & Hunters v. Ontario (Ministry of Natural Resources) (1999), 43 O.R. 
(3d) 760 (S.C.J.); (2001), 196 D.L.R. (4th) 367 (Div. Ct.); [2002] O.J. No. 1445 (C.A.); leave to appeal 
to the Supreme Court of Canada refused, [2002] S.C.C.A. No. 252 (27 June 2002). Although the 
Charter argument remains unadjudicated, except for a decision that it crossed the threshold of being a 
triable issue, Abella J.A., who wrote the judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal, did observe that 
“Concerns regarding animal welfare, include humane and ethical hunting practices, fall squarely with­
in the policy and objectives of the Fish and Wildlife Conservation Act." (para. 45).
32 Another Ontario case has, however, recognized that the Charter's, guarantee of freedom of expres­
sion might extend to practices which are harmful to non-humans. In Xentel DM Inc. v. City of Windsor,
lobby by giving it by way of statute a weaker (because not constitutionally 
entrenched) version of what it was seeking from the courts but probably would not 
have received -  viz. a right to hunt. Or at least so I suggest. The government never 
claimed that its right-to-hunt legislation was an attempt to placate persons aggrieved 
by the disappearance of the spring bear hunt but, given the timing, it seems fair to 
suggest that one possible explanation for the statutory grant of a right to hunt, at least 
in Ontario, is simply that it was an attempt by the government -  which did not want 
to do a flip-flop on the spring bear hunt — to make amends with the hunting lobby.
(c) The Right-to-Farm Movement
The fifteen-year period from 1986 to 2001 saw the appearance in all Canadian 
provinces of farm practices legislation that had the effect of insulating agricultural 
activities from suits in nuisance,33 and in some provinces from negligence actions 
and municipal by-laws as well.34 The right-to-farm movement, spurred by a grow­
ing number of land-use conflicts arising from urban sprawl (and the mega sprawl of 
urban values), was successful in capturing legislative protection for farming and 
related activity. In some instances this “related” activity was notably distant from the 
core aspects of farming. For instance, in Québec the legislation also operates to pro­
tect slaughterhouses.
This legislation, which has in fact worked to reduce the number of nuisance 
actions brought in respect of agricultural practices,35 has been supported by the claim 
that rural values and their attendant activities -  while perhaps no longer shared by the 
majority of the Canadian population -  are of particular worth and should be accord­
ed special legislative support to protect them from the common law, whose “reason­
able person”, while perhaps recently becoming somewhat less of a “reasonable 
man”, has at the same time become a “reasonable city dweller”. Interestingly, in the 
context of this paper, this legislation has even taken the form of a statute brandishing 
the word “right”: British Columbia’s farm protection statute is the Farm Practices
[2004] O.J. No. 3656 (S.C.J.) the court struck down a civic by-law which would have banned exotic 
animal acts in circuses within municipal boundaries. Gates J. found that the city was motivated by ani­
mal welfare concerns but held that “circus life constitutes a distinctive culture, one aspect of which is 
the unique bond and integration between humans and different species of animals” (para. 137) and that 
curtailing exotic animals acts would interfere with the right of circus folk to express that unique tradi­
tion.
33 The first of these was New Brunswick’s Agricultural Operations Protection Act, S.N.B. 1986, c. A- 
5-2. The last to be enacted was Newfoundland and Labrador’s Farm Practices Protection Act, S.N.L. 
2001, c. F-4.1.
34 E.g., Farm Practices Act, S.N.S. 2000, c. 3.
35 See Jonathan Kalmakoff, “'The Right to Farm’: A Survey of Farm Practices Protection in Canada”
(1999) 62 Sask L. Rev. 225.
Protection (Right to Farm) Ac?.36 The word “right” does not in fact appear in the 
substantive provisions of that legislation. It is confined to the title and further cor­
ralled by brackets -  a right of the titular, parenthetical variety. Still, in connection 
with right-to-hunt acts it does bear noting that legislatures are beginning to think of 
rural values as things that merit protection by the granting of rights.
A good deal could be said about right-to-farm statutes. In particular, it is pos­
sible to speculate that while the statutes were sold as means to protect the threatened 
family farm and its traditional way of life, their true function has been to operate as
a general subsidy---- free externalities!! — to industrial agribusiness.37 I will not
pursue that here. It suffices to suggest that the arrival of a right to hunt might be 
viewed as simply one aspect of a growing movement of rights to do country things.
(d) The Right to Bear Arms
All right, in Canada we don’t have one, yet. However, reaction by the opponents of 
the Government of Canada’s gun control registry certainly generated a measure of 
right-to-own-a-gun rhetoric, and this roughly coincided with the appearance of right- 
to-hunt legislation in provincial legislatures. Analysis of recent American pro-hunt­
ing legislation has demonstrated that one of the strains of argument used by its pro­
ponents is that it reinforces the right to bear arms, since the activity of hunting works 
to produce a weapon-savvy populace capable of effectively exercising its second 
amendment rights and also likely to be more effective contributors to national 
defence.38 I raise the possibility that the same sentiment is at work in Canada.
(e) Supplementing (and Containing?) the First Nations Right to Hunt
It may not be a coincidence that provincial legislatures saw fit to confer a general 
right to hunt in the aftermath of judicial recognition of similar rights in the context 
of aboriginal right39 and treaty40 litigation. Certainly the non-native backlash against 
the exercise of such rights -  from the Fraser River to Big Cove — is a matter of pub-
36 R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 131.
37 By way of aside, it is interesting to note that in the United States, legislation which was genuinely 
aimed at preserving the family farm (by limiting some aspects of industrial agribusiness) has recently 
been declared unconstitutional on the grounds that it violates the dormant commerce clause: South 
Dakota Farm Bureau v. Hazeltine, 340 F. 3d 583 (8th Cir. 2003), cert, denied (U.S. May 3, 2004). That 
is, while it may be legitimate for a state to favour rural values over urban ones, it has been found uncon­
stitutional for a state to favour the family farm over the corporate one.
38 James Whisker elaborates these arguments in his book The Right to Hunt (Bellevue, Wash.: Merril 
Press, 1999), an extended argument in favour of recognition of a constitutional right to hunt in the 
United States. See in particular, chapter 10, “The Right to Hunt and National Defense”.
39 R. v. Sparrow [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075.
40 R. v. Marshall [1999] 3 S.C.R. 533.
lie record, and it seems fair to speculate that one pertinent bit of context for the leg­
islative conferral of a general right to hunt is the judicial conferral, or at least 
acknowledgement, of a specific one.
(f) Forestalling Animal Rights
A final piece of context that seems worth mentioning is that of animal rights. This is 
a concept that was once on the periphery of discourse pertaining to non-humans but 
which is, or at least is perceived to be, inching closer to the respectability of the core. 
A possible contributing factor in the adoption of right-to-hunt legislation is that it is 
an effort to pre-empt any formal adoption of statutory rights for animals by erecting 
a roadblock in the form of a freedom that seems radically inconsistent with such a 
right -  viz., the right to kill them. Since rights, once enacted, are next to impossible 
to repeal, a statutory right to hunt stands as a considerable roadblock in the way of 
any movement advocating a legal right to life for non-humans.
Of course, many of those who have been in the forefront of the animal libera­
tion movement do not base their pro-animal claims on rights, and some, such as Peter 
Singer, are very explicit about this. Nevertheless, they are frequently perceived as 
doing so, and the phrase “animal rights” is commonly perceived to be the central 
plank in animal activists’ platform, partly because it is easily distorted and mocked: 
“They want to give cockroaches the right to vote!” As some evidence of this it is 
worth pointing out that much opposition to the recent efforts to update the animal 
cruelty provisions of the Criminal Code took the line that such revisions were cover 
for hidden animal rights agenda. For instance Alliance MP David Anderson opposed 
the attempts to reform the Code's animal cruelty provisions because, in his view, the 
proposals revealed a hidden political agenda to change the centuries-old legal posi­
tion of animals as property.41 Conservative MP Inky Mark claimed in the Commons 
that “this bill is not about cruelty to animals legislation. This is a bill that moves 
toward the humanization of animals in this country.”42 Mark queried whether the pro­
posed amendments amounted to “a human rights bill for animals”.43
As noted above, the attempts to revise the Code in an animal-friendly direction 
were defeated, and a major part of that defeat was the success of the amendment’s 
opponents in portraying it as an animal rights initiative. It seems significant that this 
defeat of a so-called animal rights law reform proposal coincided with the adoption 
of a statutory anti-animal right in provincial legislatures.
41 Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 1st Sess., 37th Pari., vol 137, p. 7979 (6 December 2001).
42 Ibid., at p. 7975. He went on to note that “once we take this out of the property section of the crim­
inal code and start perceiving animals from the perspective of humanity, then we are really on the slip­
pery slope to something we may regret down the road.”
43 Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, 37th Pari., 1st Sess., 16 October 2001, p. 18.
3. T h e  O ffic ia l S to ry
In this section I offer a decoction of the justifications put for the statutory grant of a 
general right to hunt. The sources here -  in default of the royal commission reports, 
departmental studies, public consultations, law reform commission reports or white 
papers that precede and accompany much legislation -  are the reported debates of the 
legislatures of Ontario, British Columbia, and Québec in relation to the statutes in 
question. Overwhelmingly these debates consist of comments in support of the bills; 
MLAs from all parties strove to outdo one another in encomionizing a statutory right 
to hunt. To some extent the justifications offered in the different provinces over­
lapped, which is not unsurprising given the statutes’ similarity. In particular the 
Ontario and British Columbia debates are markedly similar in content, though the 
Ontario debates seem somehowYuder and less formal in style than the B.C. ones, and 
more sprinkled with heckling and other hints of casual deportment.44 However, the 
content of the different provinces’ debates is not entirely interchangeable; in addition 
to the overlaps there are also some notable regional variations.
(a) A Word about the Words
While I will not essay any full-bore discourse analysis of the debates in question, I 
cannot resist the temptation -  before offering a synopsis of the justifications 
advanced by legislators for supporting a statutory right to hunt -  of making two brief 
overview comments about the vocabulary and mode of speech used to discuss the 
bills. The first is that the debates were filled with hunting stories. Many legislators, 
particularly those in Ontario and British Columbia, devoted the bulk of their official 
remarks in the legislatures to little more than recounting some hunting adventure in 
which they had participated, often in their fondly-remembered youth. These remarks 
commonly took the general form of, “one of my most cherished memories is of the 
time my dad, my uncle, my brother45 and I went bear hunting. It was great. I support 
the bill.”46 Especially in Ontario, these sentimentalized stories consumed such a sig­
nificant part of the debates that reading Hansard gives one the impression that those 
sessions at Queen’s Park must have involved turning the lights down low and sitting 
cross-legged around a campfire swapping yams of huntin’, shootin’ and fishin’. A
44 Refer to Ontario’s right-to-hunt debates on May 27, 28 and 29 and June 5 and 12, 2002.
45 The stories are frequently highly gendered. In Ontario one government member speaking in support 
of this bill made the point that “fishing contributes to male bonding”. Wayne Wettlaufer, Ontario 
Hansard, 37th Pari., 3rd Sess., 29 May 2002.
46 In Ontario, the Minister introducing the bill for debate devoted the bulk of his remarks to recount­
ing such stories: “There I was, up with Josh, my six-year-old son. He was fishing away and a fish came 
up and . . . .” When interrupted and asked what the stories had to do with the legislation, his reply 
was, “It’s hunting and fishing, and that’s what this bill is about.” Jerry Ouellette, Ontario Hansard, 37th 
Pari., 3rd Sess., 27 May 2002.
much-repeated justification for hunting is José Ortega y Gasset’s insight that “one 
does not hunt in order to kill; on the contrary, one kills in order to have hunted.”47 
However, the truer lesson from the Ontario and British Columbia Hansards appears 
to be that one hunts in order to be in a position to tell hunting stories.
Scholars interested in the normative legal sway of narrative will find fertile 
ground in these debates, which come across as an unbeatable example of government 
by chatauqua. From a purely formal point of view these hunting stories might appear 
digressive in nature, and indeed several members prefaced their remarks with some 
apology or prayer for indulgence for the tale to follow. However, that should not 
mask the stories’ true bonding and consensus-building function. It seems that for 
many legislators the most persuasive justification they could offer in support of a 
general right to hunt was to recount a hunting or fishing anecdote, and then follow 
that with a simple statement that they supported the bill. The leap from the “is” of the 
tale of the pursuit to the “ought” of support for the bill was not often spelled out 
explicitly; evidently it did not need to be.
The second drive-by observation I would make about the discourse in the leg­
islative debates around right-to-hunt legislation relates to the observation by animal 
liberationists that the true nature and extent of the violence visited upon non-humans 
by humans is systematically masked by language which hides that violence.48 Thus, 
one harvests or culls seals rather than killing them. One dines on pork rather than on 
the corpse of a pig. One wears leather rather than the skin of a cow, and so on. Again, 
a lot might be said here and I offer only the confirmatory observation that in over a 
hundred single-spaced pages of mostly justificatory debate about the right to hunt 
non-humans in Ontario, British Columbia, and Québec, the word “kill” (or its French 
cognate) does not once appear. That is, legislators can speak for many hours about 
the goodness and importance of hunting without ever mentioning the “k” word. 
Rather, much is said about the importance of a right to “harvest”, “dispatch”, “cull”, 
“take”, “take down”, “bring down” and “get” bear, deer, moose and so on.49 As one
47 José Ortega y Gassett, Meditations on Hunting, trans. Howard Wescott (New York: Scribner’s, 
1972), 110-11. This work was written in 1942 as a prologue to Edward, Count Yebes, Veinte Anos de 
Caza Major [Twenty-Years a Big Game Hunter], which was published the following year. Ortega’s 
introduction was published in Spanish and other languages several times on its own, but it was not until 
1972 that it appeared in English.
48 For a book-length exploration of this theme see Joan Dunayer, Animal Equality: Language and 
Liberation (Derwood, Md.: Ryce Publishing, 2001).
49 There were other, more colloquial euphemisms, as the following quotation reveals:
“I would say that my fondest memory would be when I was growing up on the 
farm just outside Peterborough . . . . I would be sitting with my father with the 
trusty old .22 that used to hang over the doorway on the farm, sort of sitting on 
the rail fence and poking back a few groundhogs . . . .” (John O’Toole, Ontario 
Hansard, 37th Pari., 3rd Sess., 29 May 2002.).
member noted in the British Columbia debates: “One of the big challenges when 
you’re hunting for big game is that after you find the animal and knock it down, then 
the work begins.”50 There was even a statement, in the context of deer hunting, of 
“being able to bring home a big rack.”51 Here the deer is not only metonymized by 
becoming only a big rack but, following that displacement, is further accorded the 
pleasantry of simply “being brought home”.
But I lie when I say that the word “kill” makes no appearance in the debates 
about a statutory right to hunt. It does, however, never appear in the context of human 
hunters killing. Rather, as one MLA noted in the Ontario debates:
There have been many people who have literally been killed. I know one indi­
vidual who swerved to avoid a deer and ran into the ditch and hit a culvert and 
died.52
In other words, in the legislative debates in support of a right to hunt, deer kill 
humans. Humans, on the other hand, just bring deer home.
More could be written about the discourse of the Hansard reports of right-to- 
hunt legislation, but I turn now to an account of the substantive points made about 
that legislation, the great majority of which were arguments in support of the bills.
(b) Conservation
The most frequently-voiced justificatory rationale was conservation -  the claim that 
hunting was essential to prudent and effective wildlife management. The claim was 
repeatedly made that hunters are the true (though, alas, often unacknowledged) envi­
ronmentalists who, partly through their self-interested care for habitat preservation, 
but principally by the beneficial activity of killing, conserve populations of wild ani­
mals.
Hunters are conservationists and are key to sustaining our wildlife populations 
in healthy conditions. Hunters put more time, effort and money into conserva­
tion and environment programs than any other people. Hunters, fishermen and 
farmers are the original environmentalists.53
50 Dennis MacKay, B.C. Hansard, 37th Pari., 3rd Sess., Vol. 9, No. 8, 4069 (28 October 2002).
51 Kevin Krueger, B.C. Hansard, 37th Pari., 3rd Sess. Vol. 9, No. 16, 4249 (4 November 2002).
52 Ernie Parsons, Ontario Hansard, 37th Pari., 3rd Sess., 27 May 2002.
53 R. Gary Stewart, ibid.
In the Québec debates it was noted that with the disappearance of the great predator 
species it was important that humans take over the job of killing the prey species so 
as to maintain a balance in nature.54
Of course, killing will not generally benefit the individual animal that is killed, 
but the claim here took the form of asserting that hunting can be a useful tool to see 
that weak individuals are removed from certain populations and that the strong sur­
vive and breed, thus ensuring fitter general populations of prey species.55 The obvi­
ous objection here is that, unlike non-human hunters, who do tend to select the weak­
est victims, human predation tends to seek out the strongest, fittest targets -  the deer 
with the big racks -  and that the long-term effect of that activity is to weaken the gene 
pool of prey species. There is, in short, a legitimate dispute (into which I will not 
enter here) about the effects of hunting on the populations of prey species. However, 
this dispute played no role in the debates about right-to-hunt legislation. There was, 
in short, no informed debate about the real effects of human hunters on prey species 
and the environment. Indeed there were some laughably erroneous statements, such 
as the unchallenged claim that no species of wildlife has been threatened or endan­
gered by hunting since before World War I.56 In short, perhaps because the proposed 
legislation was viewed as symbolic rather than substantive, the argument that hunt­
ing helps the environment, while it was frequently made, was advanced in a notably 
unscientific fashion.
An additional angle here was that in an age of privatization and cutbacks (in 
particular, fewer government fish and game wardens), the conservationist effect of 
hunting has the potential to supplement and even replace governmental conserva­
tionist initiatives. Hunting is privatized conservation. In Ontario this was the occa­
sion for a few opposition party digs at the government for having cut back on game 
wardens in the first place,57 but that did not alter the general all-party harmony on the 
point that guaranteeing a right to hunt was good for the environment. It was further 
claimed that this would have particular benefits for First Nations communities, who 
have an economic dependence on certain quarry species.58 That is, granting a gen­
eral right to hunt to the population was a pro-First Nations move since it would help 
to preserve and make healthier the species which are hunted, which in turn will help 
Indians who depend on such species for sustenance.
54 David Whissell, Québec Hansard, 36th Leg., 2nd Sess., 19 December 2002.
55 See for instance Patrick Bell, B.C. Hansard, 37th Pari., 3rd Sess., Vol. 8, No. 11, p. 3789.
56 Bill Bennett, B.C. Hansard, 37th Pari., 3rd Sess., Vol. 8, no. 4, p. 3578 (27 May 2002). This would 
come as news to the rhinoceros, the polar bear and the bighorn sheep.
57 Ernie Parsons, Ontario Hansard, 37th Pari., 3rd Sess., 27 May 2002, Caroline Di Cocco, ibid.
58 Bill Belsey, B.C. Hansard, 37th Pari., 3rd Sess., Vol. 8. No. 11, p. 3792 (7 October 2002).
(c) The Family that Kills Together
Another much-stated theme is that hunting is a generator of family togetherness, and 
especially that it is unbeatable for bridging otherwise impregnable intergenerational 
gaps. In short, right-to-hunt legislation was pro-family legislation. Of course this was 
a common subtext in the remarks of those MLAs who chose to justify their support 
for the bill by recounting a hunting tale, for such tales commonly had a family 
theme,59 but the claim was also made explicitly and repeatedly that hunting is great 
for (presumably human) family togetherness.
(d) Enshrining Tradition (or, White Folks Have Heritage Too)
Related to the assertion that protecting the right to hunt will promote family bonding 
was the claim that it is an ancient tradition, and moreover one that is currently under 
threat. In the view of our legislators this tradition was no matter of a mere few hun­
dred years. Rather, we were informed that “[o]ver history, since the dawn of man, we 
have been hunters and gatherers . . . .”60 One member was content to be more spe­
cific than simply “dawn of man” and offered the claim that we have been hunting for 
2.5 million years.61 However, the ancient tradition was perceived to be under attack, 
and right-to-hunt legislation would protect it by guaranteeing “the right that our fore­
parents took for granted.”62
There were a number of interesting sub-themes here. One was to pick up on 
the ancient constitution of Britain (there were references to the Magna Carta63) and 
the argument that the right to hunt is one of the ancient liberties of a free people. Of 
course this is the angle that Blackstone in his Commentaries took on hunting, and 
particularly with respect to the game laws enacted in England starting in 1671. In 
Blackstone’s view, hunting was one of the Saxon liberties and restrictions on that
59 And those that did not have a family theme had a buddy theme. There was surprisingly little evoca­
tion of the solitary hunter. Tales of the solitary hunter are frequently associated with a trope that val­
orizes the hunting experience as a near-mystical one, painting the hunt as a unique, intense and irre- 
producible experience -  the sentiment that you’re never as alive as when you kill.
60 Bill Belsey, B.C. Hansard, 37th Pari., 3rd Sess., Vol. 8. , No. 11, p. 3791 (7 October 2002). There 
was a similar observation in the Ontario debates: “[H]umans have been hunters and gathers since they 
walked upright.” Caroline Di Cocco, Ontario Hansard, 37th pari., 3rd Sess. 27 May 2002.
61 Bill Bennett, B.C. Hansard, 37th Pari., 3rd Sess., Vol. 4, No. 4, p. 1815 (12 March 2002).
62 Harold Long, B.C. Hansard, 37th Pari., 3rd Sess. Vol. 9, No. 1, 3879 (21 October 2002).
63 This, however, was in the context of the right to fish: Mike Hunter, B.C. Hansard, 37th Pari., 3rd 
Sess. Vol. 9, No. 1, 3883 (21 October 2002). There is nothing in the Magna Carta about hunting.
activity were a key element in the tyranny of the Norman yoke.64 As noted by one 
B.C. MLA, the right to hunt was a general right of persons.
A second interesting sub-theme of the argument based on tradition relates to 
First Nations. Both the Ontario and British Columbia legislators noted that the 
courts, in construing the confirmation of aboriginal rights in the Charter (especially 
in Sparrow65) and treaty rights (Marshall66), had granted broad rights to hunt to First 
Nations peoples. As the following two quotations from the British Columbia 
Hansard show, the enactment of right-to-hunt legislation could be justified as equal- 
ity-minded legislation which sought to put the rest of the population on a par with 
First Nations. This could be justified by the argument that they (the non-First 
Nations) had hunting traditions of their own:
[W]hat it really does is to entrench the right of all British Columbians to fishing 
and hunting. That’s what first First nations Nations are doing when they are com­
ing to the treaty table. They are asking for the same right that the member . . .  is 
suggesting we should enable all British Columbians to have. I think it’s most 
suitable.67
•  •  •
We talk about first nations and having hunting and fishing as part o f their her­
itage and their right. I believe it’s all o f our rights in British Columbia and cer­
tainly in our country . . .  .68
Of course it is possible to perceive an element of non-native backlash in this. There 
were references to the extension of First Nations’ hunting rights amounting to an 
“erosion of our [si'c] rights in the last ten years”. In this connection it is interesting to 
note one of the few lines of objection to the legislation voiced in any of the three 
provincial legislatures. In Ontario, NDP member Gilles Bisson argued that the legis­
lation might affect aboriginal rights and that the government thus had a constitution­
al obligation to consult First Nations about it pursuant to the Charter, an obligation 
it had not fulfilled. Receiving no satisfaction on this point, he went so far as to pro­
pose an amendment which would take the form of adding to the Ontario bill a clause 
that stipulated that nothing in its grant of a general right to hunt to the entire popu­
64 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 14th ed. (London: A. Strahan, 1803), 
vol.II at 414-15 . (vol. 11, ch. 27).
65 Supra note 39.
66 Supra note 4039.
67 Hon. Patrick Bell, B.C. Hansard, 37th Pari., 3rd Sess. Vol. 8, No. 11, 3791 (7 October 2002).
68 Blair Lekstrom B.C. Hansard, 37th Pari., 3rd Sess., Vol. 8, No 11, 3794 (7 October 2002).
lace would ever operate to derogate from aboriginal persons’ right to hunt.69 This 
proposal met with the counter-argument from the Minister that the proposed amend­
ing clause was unnecessary, since no court would ever apply the legislation in such 
a fashion. The amendment was soundly defeated and the NDP’s concerns for the abo­
riginal right to hunt did not keep it from supporting the unamended bill.
(e) Country Matters
Related to the view that hunting is an ancient tradition of all peoples is the claim that 
it operates to support a key aspect of a rural way of life which is under attack by 
urban values. Both in the Ontario and British Columbia debates there were numer­
ous statements to the effect that, while city folk might not know it, hunting was cen­
tral to a country existence. However, it was a way of life that was under threat by 
urban values:
It is this mentality of those who are separated from the realities o f the acts that 
is setting the moral and public standards of acceptance for rural activities.70
The Ontario and B.C. debates in particular were replete with statements from rural 
MLAs to the effect that city folk didn’t know where their food came from, were out 
of touch and were inclined to impose their values on country-dwellers.71 There was 
little effort by urban MLAs to take issue with this. Mostly they seemed to sit silent­
ly and allow themselves and their constituents to be painted as out-of-touch city folk. 
The most that urban MPs could muster by way of response was the occasional fee­
ble attempt to claim that city dwellers were not as bad as all that. As the member for 
Victoria put it:
I believe that people in rural B.C. are very intelligent, very passionate people. I 
believe that people in urban B.C. are very passionate, very intelligent people.72
A sub-theme here, voiced by a couple of members in British Columbia was that the 
right to hunt would reinforce a right to organic meat. The claim was made that, in the 
absence of the ability to hunt, our access to meat would be limited to the commer-
69 Ontario Hansard, 37th Pari. 3rd Sess., 5 June 2002.
70 Ken Stewart, B.C. Hansard, 37th Pari., 3rd Sess., Vol. 9, No. 1, 3879 (21 October 2002).
71 In fact such comments were not limited to rural MLAs; they came from the representatives of small­
er urban centres as well. Wayne Wettlaufer, a Conservative MLA from Kitchener Centre, spoke in 
favour of the Ontario bill. Following the obligatory recounting of his early memories of fishing with 
his father and grandfather he noted that such recollections would not be available to “a tree hugger from 
the city of Toronto, who thinks the sun rises in Markham and sets in Mississauga and doesn’t know 
what a fish looks like, other than what they get down sat the local fish market. . . .” (Ontario Hansard, 
37th Pari. 3rd Sess., 29 May 2002).
72 Jeff Bray, B.C. Hansard, 37th Pari., 3rd Sess., Vol. 9, No. 8, 4071 (28 October 2002).
daily produced, hormone- and antibiotic-laced products available in supermarkets, 
and that in order to avoid that “we should have a right to an organic food source”.73 
The argument grounded on a fundamental right of access to organic food was not one 
that found voice in either the Ontario or Québec legislatures; it’s a west coast right.
(f) The Economy
In all three provinces -  Ontario, B.C. and Québec -  the legislation was supported on 
the grounds that hunting contributed to the economy, both in terms of license fees 
and consumer purchases by all hunters, and especially by attracting tourist dollars. In 
B.C. the claim was made that recreational hunters and anglers contributed about a 
billion dollars a year to the provincial economy, in the Ontario debates the figure was 
given as 3.5 billion, and in Québec it was 1.3 billion.74 In no case was the source of 
the statistic given.
Interestingly, in Québec the economic argument was by far the primary one. 
The Québec debates were far briefer than either the Ontario or British Columbia ones 
and display comparatively little evidence of justifying the legislation by the telling 
of hunting stories, or even of direct appeal to the claim that hunting is good for fam­
ilies. And, perhaps for obvious cultural reasons, there was no claim that it was a right 
which was first secured by the barons at Runymeade in 1455. Overwhelmingly the 
Québec legislation was justified on the basis of conservation75 and the hard-headed 
claim that hunting, especially tourist dollars, was important to the provincial econo­
my.76
Of course there are many other activities of greater importance to the 
economies of those provinces than hunting. If economic impact was really the key 
then British Columbia and Québec would have been better advised to enact statuto­
ry rights to ski, and Ontario a right to make cars. That is, one might have expected 
the economic argument in support of a right to hunt to be supported by some hard
73 Harold Long, B.C. Hansard, 37th Pari., 3rd Sess., Vol. 8, No. 11, 3796 (7 October 2002). 
Comparable points were made by Ken Stewart, B.C. Hansard, 37th Pari., 3rd Sess., Vol. 9., No. 1, 
3880-81 (21 October 2002) and G. Trumper, B.C. Hansard, 37th Pari., 3rd Sess., Vol. 9, No. 8 4073 
(28 October 2002).
74 Bill Belsey, B.C. Hansard, 37th Pari., 3rd Sess., Vol 8, No. 11, p. 3791 (7 October 2002). Statement 
of Jerry Ouellette, Minister of Natural Resources on moving second reading of the Heritage Hunting 
and Fishing Act 2002: Ontario Hansard, 37th Pari., 3rd Sess., 27 May 2002. Statement of Richard 
Legendre, Minister of Tourism, Leisure and Sport, Québec Hansard, 36th Leg., 2nd Sess., 19 
December 2002.
75 For instance see supra note 54.
76 In the United States, persons advocating the recognition of a legal right to hunt have maintained that 
the “economic argument, in the long run, may be the strongest and best of all.” Whisker, The Right to 
Hunt, supra note 38, at 166.
evidence that the activity was, or was likely to become, in jeopardy. However, there 
was none of this: the argument in general was simply that hunting was good for the 
provincial economy (even though city dwellers might not be aware of that) and that 
it might be under threat, so the province should grant a statutory right to do it.
(g) Forestalling Animal Rights
It was mentioned in the previous section that a possible piece of pertinent context for 
the arrival of right-to-act acts is that they are an effort to steal a march on those who 
might push toward a legislative acknowledgement of animal rights. There was no 
mention in the debates on provincial right-to-hunt legislation of the perceived animal 
rights theme in the attempts to reform the animal cruelty provisions of the Criminal 
Code, and little overt mention of the need to pass right-to-hunt statutes to counter the 
animal rights crowd. However, there were occasional remarks of the form:
I’m not a lawyer but I believe [that by passing this bill] we create a situation 
where those who would legally impede someone from doing what is legally cor­
rect would have a little more difficulty.77
That is, there was no explicit mention of internationally-funded animal rights terror­
ists, as there was in the context of the federal government’s attempts to revise the ani­
mal cruelty provisions of the Criminal Code. But there were some vague references 
to groups that might, in some unspecified way, try to outlaw hunting, and it was sug­
gested that by enacting a general right-to-hunt such initiatives could be foiled.
4. Careful Where You Point That Right
Right-to-hunt legislation in Canada has a curious pedigree and an interesting set of 
official justifications. It remains to be seen whether other provinces will follow the 
lead of Ontario, British Columbia, and Québec and enact such statutes. Certainly the 
issue is very much alive in the United States, with one more state amending its con­
stitution by referendum in the November 2004 elections to add a right to hunt.78 
Obviously I am no great fan of right-to-hunt legislation. One obvious concern is that 
it is a waste of that rare commodity -  time -  for legislatures to be passing their days 
telling hunting stories, especially when the result is a statute of symbolic nature. A 
more significant concern, in my judgment, is that we cannot be confident that such 
statutes will in future be confined to the symbolic role that their progenitors and pro­
ponents claim for them. I suggested in the introduction that one hazard of writing
77 R. Hawes, B.C. Hansard, 37th Pari., 3rd Sess., Vol 8, No. 11, 3793 (7 October 2002).
78 That state was Louisiana, where the referendum proposal gained the support of 81 % of those who 
voted.
“right” in a symbolic statute is that, somewhere down the line, it might be accorded 
a more than merely symbolic effect. For instance, it might compel a decision in a law 
suit which is different from the decision that would have been reached in the statute’s 
absence.
Of course any legislation runs the risk of having effects its originators did not 
anticipate. The problem of unanticipated effects is hardly confined to acts that take 
the form of grants of rights.79 However, as will have been seen from my account of 
the legislative debates on the right-to-hunt bills, such bills, because they are adver­
tised as being purely symbolic, may not be subject to the degree of legislative or 
committee scrutiny that a substantive statute attracts, thus increasing the possibility 
of unanticipated effects. Just as there was no serious discussion of the contestable 
claim that hunting is beneficial to the environment, there was little consideration of 
the circumstances in which the statute might possibly have an effect, and attempts to 
inoculate the Ontario legislation in that regard were defeated.80 Of course, any sub­
sequent attempts to argue -  say, in the course of litigation -  that the “right” in a right- 
to-hunt act is a real right would be met with an appeal to the passages in the debates 
in which we were assured that such was not the case. Still, I want to suggest here that 
the concern of unintended effects is a real one. Certainly it would not be eliminated 
by an appeal to Hansard, for while that source might be persuasive it would hardly 
be regarded as dispositive.
The discussions in parts 2 and 3 of this paper have, in passing, given rise to a 
couple of scenarios where a court might be urged to give some real effect to the gen­
eral right to hunt. One of these is in an attempt to limit the effect of a First Nations 
right to hunt, whether that arose as a general aboriginal right or as something prom­
ised in a treaty. We have already seen that the grant of a First Nations right to hunt 
will have an effect on the ability of non-First Nations groups to kill as many non­
humans as they might if First Nations did not have this right. There are only so many 
animals to go around. Obviously courts will be faced with many circumstances in 
which they have to draw a line between a First Nation’s right to hunt and the 
right/privilege/entitlement of some non-First Nations groups to do the same in the 
same area. If non-First Nations groups are accorded a statutory right to hunt will that 
line be drawn in the same place that it would in the absence of such a right? Of 
course, the right in right-to-hunt legislation does not have constitutional status, but 
that does not mean that in the general process of balancing and line-drawing it will 
be entirely without effect.
79 Which is perhaps an argument against any symbolic legislation, regardless of whether it uses the 
term “right”.
80 Supra footnote 68.
Another matter mentioned above was anti-hunter harassment legislation, those 
statutes in force in many, though not all, Canadian provinces that make it an offence 
to interfere with hunters as they go about their business. The grant of a general right- 
to-hunt could easily affect on such matters. For instance, British Columbia has a 
comparatively narrow anti-hunter harassment statute, one that does not make it an 
offence to frighten quarry away from hunting grounds.81 Let us imagine someone 
engaged, or proposed to engage in, frightening quarry away from hunting grounds in 
that province. Might not hunters bring a civil action against such an activity claim­
ing damages and an injunction, and might not they argue in support of their claim 
that the activity was an interference with their statutory right to hunt? I do not pur­
port to judge the effect of such an argument, only to assert that it is a plausible claim 
that belies the legislators’ assurances that right to hunt legislation will have no effect.
It is not difficult to conjure up other scenarios where the grant of a right to hunt 
might be given a more than symbolic effect. Consider for instance the Supreme Court 
of Canada’s decision in the well-known torts case of Cook v. Lewis.82 There the 
court was prepared to reverse the onus of proof on the defendant hunters, one of 
whom (but not the other, though it was uncertain which) had shot the plaintiff. In his 
reasons in support of the judgment against the hunters, Rand J. noted that hunting 
was a privilege. Were a similar case to arise tomorrow in a province which had enact­
ed right-to-hunt legislation, would not the defendant hunters seek to distinguish Cook 
v. Lewis by arguing that, in the years since that case had been decided hunting had 
been elevated from a privilege to a right, and that it followed that the anti-hunter, bur- 
den-reversing result in Cook v. Lewis should not be imposed today?
Obviously such an argument is hardly decisive. I don’t claim that it is even 
very good, but it seems sufficient to hang a judicial hat on. I offer it here mainly as 
an illustration, one that might easily be multiplied, of the phenomenon that lawyers 
and judges are frequently inclined to behave as if the word right, at least when it 
appears in a statute, means something -  that it has genuine operational traction.
The greater concern may not be that the passage of right-to-hunt acts will alter 
the results of future litigation, but rather that such statutes stand as an effective road­
block to any fundamental legislative reform of the legal position of non-humans. 
Rights, once enacted, are next to impossible to remove. If humans have been grant­
ed the statutory right to kill non-humans, then any efforts to recognize that non­
humans, or at least some class of them, have a right to life has becomes considerably 
more difficult. Of course, no legislative initiative of that character could be expected
81 Wildlife Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 488, ss. 46 and 80. The statute makes it an office offence to interfere 
with traps or obstruct hunters while they are actually hunting, but not to frighten away quarry.
82 [1951] S.C.R. 830.
any time soon. It remains as utopian as the abolition of the slave trade in Africans 
must have seemed in the 1700s. Still, one goal of right-to-hunt legislation was to pre­
clude such a development, and it seems unfortunate that such a development took 
place with so little public debate or true legislative deliberation.
